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Abstract
The United States and, to a slightly lesser extent, Canada have come to regard personal bankruptcy as a routine
method of discharging debts, enabling the debtor to make a fresh start. By contrast, in the United Kingdom,
bankruptcy is still seen as a remedy of last resort, and creditors may retain the right to enforce debts. The
difference in approach is due to the fact that the United States and Canada have traditionally given priority to
risk taking over security, while the United Kingdom has continued to give priority to security over risk taking.
However, the British government's enthusiasm for flexible labour markets and entrepreneurship suggests that
this may be about to change. While many people in the United States are having second thoughts about their
liberal approach to bankruptcy, and the American government is coming under intense pressure from the
credit industry to make it harder for people to protect their assets, the British government has recently set in
train a review of the legal and social framework of bankruptcy to see whether Britain can learn from the
American experience.
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THE OVERSEAS DIMENSION: WHAT
CAN CANADA AND THE UNITED
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UNITED KINGDOM?©
BY MIICHAEL ADLER*
The United States and, to a slightly lesser extent,
Canada have come to regard personal bankruptcy as a
routine method of discharging debts, enabling the
debtor to make a fresh start. By contrast, in the United
Kingdom, bankruptcy is still seen as a remedy of last
resort, and creditors may retain the right to enforce
debts. The difference in approach is due to the fact that
the United States and Canada have traditionally given
priority to risk taking over security, while the United
Kingdom has continued to give priority to security over
risk taking. However, the British government's
enthusiasm for flexible labour markets and
entrepreneurship suggests that this may be about to
change. While many people in the United States are
having second thoughts about their liberal approach to
bankruptcy, and the American government is coming
under intense pressure from the credit industry to make
it harder for people to protect their assets, the British
government has recently set in train a review of the
legal and social framework of bankruptcy to see
whether Britain can learn from the American
experience.
Les Etats-Unis et, dans une moindre mesure, le Canada
sont arrives 5 considerer la faillite personnelle comme
une method routini~re pour d6charger des dettes,
rendant possible au debiteur de faire un nouveau
depart. Par contre, dans le Royaume-Uni, la faillite est
toujours consideree comme une remade de dernier
recours, et les cr6anciers pourraient garder le droit
d'enforcer les dettes. La diff6rence dans I'approche est
due au fait que les Etats-Unis et le Canada ont
traditonnellement donn6 la priorite a ]a prise de risques
plut6t qu'A la s6curite, tandis que le Royaume-Uni a
continue A donner la priorite a la securite plut6t qu'A la
prise de risques. Pourtant, I'enthousiasme du
gouvernement britannique pour les marches de travail
plus flexibles et I'entrepreneuriat, sugg~re que cela est
sur le point de changer. Tandis que beaucoup de gens
aux Etats-Unis commencent a refl6chir sur leur
approche lib6rale h 1'egard de la faillite, et le
gouvernement am6ricain se trouve sous une grande
pression de la part de l'industrie des cr6dits afin de
rendre plus difficile aux gens de prot6ger leur actifs, le
gouvernement britannique a recemment mis en marche
une r6vision du cadre 16gal et social de la faillite pour
voir si la Grande Bretagne pourrait s'inspirer de
l'experience americaine.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I want to say at the outset that I am an enthusiast for
comparative socio-legal research, not least because (and this is
particularly so when one of the countries which is being compared is
your own) it forces you to question institutions and practices which you
might otherwise take for granted. However, we need to be very wary
about the prospects for legal and other institutional transplants-i.e.,
about the prospects for successfully uprooting and transplanting legal
rules and institutional arrangements from one socio-economic and legal
environment to another, perhaps, very different one.
A. Insolvency in the United Kingdom
Since there are two separate jurisdictions in the United
Kingdom, I shall deal separately with England and Wales, and with
Scotland.
1. England and Wales
The government of the day described the Insolvency Act 19861 as
a reforming Act that was designed to address and ease the growing
problem of personal indebtedness by tipping the balance, ever-so-
slightly, in favour of the relief and rehabilitation of the debtor. The Act
introduced a number of changes, perhaps the most important of which
was the automatic discharge of most bankrupts after three years2-the
exceptions being where the debtor has been bankrupt before (during the
previous fifteen years), 3 or has not cooperated with the Official Receiver
or trustee who has supervised the bankruptcy. 4
1 (U.K.), 1986, c. 45.
2 Ibid. s. 279.
31bid. s. 279(1)(a).
4 Ibid s. 279(3).
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The passage of the Act resulted in a subsfantial increase in the
number of individual bankruptcies-bankruptcy orders increased from
7,093 in 19865 (the year before the Act came into effect) to 32,106 in
1992-i.e., by 353 per cent over six years. However, for reasons that are
far from clear, the number of bankruptcy orders has fallen each year
since then-the number fell to 19,892 in 1997, a decrease of 36 per cent
in five years. The introduction of individual voluntary arrangements6
does not explain the fall in the number of bankruptcy orders-they rose
to a peak of 5,679 in 1993, but have fallen off somewhat since then,
numbering 4,545 in 1997.7
In light of trends in the number of consumer bankruptcies in
other jurisdictions, and other contextual developments-for example,
the growth of consumer credit-it is unlikely that the (slight)
liberalization in bankruptcy law brought about by the Insolvency Act 1986
can account for more than part of the early increase in the number of
bankruptcy orders. Thus, most of the early increase and all of the
subsequent decrease remain to be accounted for.
2. Scotland
Prior to the passage of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985,8
there were very few personal bankruptcies in Scotland. This was mainly
because a trustee had to be paid out of the debtor's assets, and where
there were insufficient assets to pay the trustee in full, it was difficult to
persuade a trustee to act. In order to deal with this problem, the 1985
Act introduced public funding of "small assets cases" 9-to the extent
that the debtor's assets were insufficient, the trustee was reimbursed by
taxpayers.
5 See Lord Chancellor's Department, Judicial Statistics: England and Wales (London: Her
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1986).
6 See InsolvencyAct 1986, supra note 1, s. 252.
7 See Appendix, Table 1, below, for the annual numbers of bankruptcy orders and individual
arrangements from 1988-1997.
8 (U.K.), 1985, c. 66.
9 See ibicL Schedule 2. Note that Schedule 2 does not actually use the term "small assets," but
the procedures outlined in it come into play where the debtor's assets are insufficient to pay for the
remuneration of trustees, and the court determines that these costs should be met by taxpayers out
of a public fund.
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After the passage of the Act, there was a huge increase in the
number of awards of sequestration.10 In 1985-1986 (the year before the
Act came into effect) there were 298 sequestrations;ll three years later,
in 1988-1989, there were 1,612; and by 1992-1993 the number had risen
to 11,970-a 4,000 per cent increase over seven years. 12
The increase was due to an unintended anomaly in the Act,
known as the "trust deed route." Under the Act, sequestration could be
granted on the petition of the creditor or creditors.13 However, a trustee
under a trust deed had title to petition for sequestration without
consent14 and, encouraged by the Citizens Advice Bureaux, Money
Advice Centres, and other debt counselling agencies, debtors
increasingly took advantage of this loophole.
Insolvency practitioners who acted as trustees were clearly on to
a good thing-prior to the introduction of block payments in 1990,15 the
average payment to trustees was almost £3,000 (C$7,500) per case.
Subsequently, they received a block payment of £1,800 (C$4,500) plus a
second payment of £250 (C$625), and further small payments in lengthy
cases. However, debtors were clearly prepared to go along with this,
presumably because they regarded sequestration as being in their best
interests. Although a stigma still attaches to bankruptcy in the United
Kingdom, it is undoubtedly less than it was; debtors are protected from
attempts by creditors to enforce court decisions, or to pressure them into
paying in other ways and, after three years, they receive an automatic
discharge.16 However, the cost to the taxpayer was quite considerable.
Prior to the 1985Act, the Scottish system of sequestration was effectively
self-financing and, in proposing the legislation, the Scottish Law
Commission made a serious miscalculation: they anticipated an
additional annual expenditure of about £30,000-40,000 (C$75,000-
100,000) but, by 1990-1991, the cost had risen to £10 million (C$25
10 "Sequestration" is the name usually given to the court procedure which follows on a
petition by the debtor or a creditor for the appointment of a trustee. The strict meaning of the term
is a judicial order that transfers property from the control of its possessor.
11 See B. McBryde, "The Scottish Experience of Bankruptcy" in H. Rajak, ed., Insolvency
Law: Theory and Practice (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1993) 117 at 117.
12 See Appendix, Table 2, below.
13 See Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985, supra note 8, s. 59.
1 4 Ibid. s. 5(2)(c).
15 Circular letter from the Accountant in Bankruptcy to trustees (14 September 1990).
16 See Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985, supra note 8, s. 54.
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million) and, by 1993-1994, to £26 million (C$65 million).17 Although
some people continued to agree that "wiping the slate clean" was in the
public interest, the "trust deed route" to sequestration provided a
massive subsidy to private insolvency practitioners, and the escalating
cost of the scheme appeared to have no end. Inevitably, perhaps, the
government determined to put a stop to it.
The loophole was plugged by the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act
1993,18 which ended a trustee's power to petition for sequestration
without the creditors' consent. Under the Act, trustees can still petition
for sequestration, but this will only be granted if the court decides that it
is in the best interests of the creditors, or if the debtor has failed to
honour the terms of the trust deed.19 The Accountant in Bankruptcy, a
public official whose role is analogous to that of the Official Receiver in
England and Wales, now acts as trustee in all sequestrations-except
those where an insolvency practitioner is elected or appointed by the
creditors-and may either administer the sequestration using his or her
own staff, or appoint agents to do so under contract. In addition, the Act
empowers the court to award sequestration without the concurrence of
the creditors if they have taken legal steps to enforce the debt, or have
objected to the registration of a protected trust deed.
As a result of the 1993 Act, the "trust deed route" to
sequestration came to an abrupt end. At the same time, there was an
increase in the number of sequestrations initiated by the debtor but
without the agreement of the creditors, 20 and an increase in the number
of registered protected trust deeds. After a rapid fall (which, unlike the
smaller decrease in England and Wales, can be attributed to legislative
changes), the number of sequestrations appears to have settled down at
around 2,500 per year, and the number of insolvencies at around 3,500
per year, both totals growing at between 5-10 per cent per year.21 The
cost to the taxpayer has likewise settled down at around £2.8 million
(C$7 million) per year 22-i.e., about 10 per cent of what it had been a
few years before.
17 Accountant in Bankruptcy, Annual Report for 1997/98 (Edinburgh: Accountant in
Bankruptcy, 1998) at 3 [hereinafterAnnual Report].
18 (U.K.), 1993, c. 6.
19 Ibid. s. 3, amending Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985, supra note 8, s. 5.
20 See Appendix, Table 3, below.
21 See Appendix, Table 2, below.
2 2 SeeAnnual Report, supra note 17 at 3.
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B. What Can Canada and the United States Learn
From the United Kingdom?
My answer to the question that I was asked to address is pretty
clear-very little. First of all, the contexts are very different. Some
rough-and-ready calculations based on the data compiled by Trent
Craddock indicate that the amount of consumer credit per head of
population is approximately US$5,000 in the United States; C$3,000 in
Canada; and £2,000 in the United Kingdom.23 The credit economy in the
United Kingdom resembles that in North America some years ago.
Second, the legal responses to debt or default are completely
different. The data in Craddock's study illustrates this very clearly. The
insolvency rates in the three countries are approximately 5.0 per 1,000
population in the United States; 3.0 per 1,000 population in Canada; and
0.5 per 1,000 population in the United Kingdom. Moreover, since about
40 per cent of personal bankruptcies in the United Kingdom are
instigated by creditors, the United Kingdom figure inflates the extent to
which personal bankruptcy is used as a remedy by debtors.
Consumer credit plays a very important, and growing, role in
stimulating consumption and fostering growth in most capitalist
societies. Inevitably there will be casualties, people who take on
commitments that they are subsequently unable to meet, but societal
responses to this situation vary a great deal. The United States and, to a
slightly lesser extent, Canada, have come to regard personal bankruptcy
as a routine method of discharging debts, enabling the debtor to make a
fresh start. By contrast, the United Kingdom has not: although creditors
may, at some point, choose to write off their debts, they retain the right
to enforce them, and bankruptcy in the United Kingdom is still seen as a
remedy of last resort.
Where does this leave us? In the United Kingdom, we continue
to rely heavily on debt enforcement through the courts, although
judgments entered, and the number of warrants of execution granted,
have not increased much over time. This is largely due to what has been
termed "systemic rationalization"-developments in consumer credit
that have increased the attractiveness of settlement without resort to the
23 See T. Craddock, "International Consumer Insolvency Statistics" (Conference on the
Contemporary Challenges of Consumer Bankruptcies in a Comparative Context, Faculty of Law,
University of Toronto, 21-22 August 1998) [unpublished].
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courts.24 These developments, which have been many and varied,
include: (1) changes in the range of available credit facilities to allow for
more flexible payment of debts, such as the increased use of credit cards;
(2) the increased dominance in the credit market of larger companies
that can afford to finance the rescheduling of repayments without
suffering undue financial hardship; (3) the increased use of direct debit,
standing order and overdraft facilities to ease the repayment of debts,
and the similar effect of more direct deductions from wages and social
security payments; and (4) the increased use of pre-payment
arrangements, especially in the utilities industries.
These changes notwithstanding, I certainly do not wish to give
the impression that everything in the garden is rosy. Far from it-the
benchmark survey of credit and debt by Richard Berthoud and Elaine
Kempson 2S drew a grim picture of the extent of debt and its insidious
effects on those concerned, especially on those with low incomes, most
of whom are dependent on social security. The Blair government is
seriously committed to an ambitious set of programs, collectively known
as the "New Deal," which attempt to get people off welfare and into
work, but, to the extent that people do move into employment, any debts
they may have will again become targets for creditors. The New Deal
would be much more attractive to those receiving benefits if, by making
themselves insolvent or by some other means, they were able to make a
fresh start.
II. CONCLUSION
Although I believe that North Americans have rather little to
learn from the United Kingdom as regards bankruptcy, I also believe (in
spite of the "health warning" I gave at the outset) that the United
Kingdom has a good deal to learn from the general approach to
insolvency adopted in the United States and Canada. The United States
and (to a slightly lesser degree) Canada's enthusiasm for market
capitalism has reflected a preference for risk over security. However, the
United States and Canada have also recognized that this will inevitably
24 See R.A. Kagan, "The Routinization of Debt Collection: An Essay on Social Change and
Conflict in the Courts" (1984) 18 L. & Soc. Rev. 323; and M. Adler & D. McMillan, "Credit and
Debt" in G. Fyfe, ed., Poor and Paying for It: The Price of Living on a Low Income (Edinburgh: Her
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1994).
25 See R. Berthoud & E. Kempson, Credit and Debt: The PSI Study (London: Policy Studies
Institute, 1992).
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produce some casualties, that success for some will be achieved along
with failure for others, but that these casualties can be rehabilitated
through bankruptcy by giving those who fail the opportunity to try again.
In the United Kingdom, we have traditionally given priority to security
over risk but, in recent years, we have begun to embrace flexible labour
markets and entrepreneurship-in short, to promote uncertainty and
risk. However, with one or two notable exceptions, 26 little attention has
been given to the problem of how best to deal with the adverse
consequences of this strategy.
This situation may be about to change. According to a report in
The Guardian,2 7 the British government has recently set in train a review
of the legal and social framework of bankruptcy to see if Britain can
learn from the American experience. Somewhat perversely, we are doing
so just at the time when many people in the United States are having
second thoughts about their liberal approach to bankruptcy, and the
American government is coming under intense pressure from the credit
industry to make it harder for people to protect their assets. However, I
hope that the review set up by the British government will come to
recognize the merits of what, in spite of the many differences between
the United States and Canadian approaches, we can nevertheless refer
to as the North American approach to insolvency. I do not favour a
residual welfare state in which the role of government is restricted to the
provision of a safety net for society's casualties. On the contrary, I favour
a more institutional welfare state in which the government plays a
leading role in promoting the welfare of all its citizens. However, it is a
mistake to think that an institutional welfare state does not need a social
safety net.
26 See, for example, W. Hutton, "High Risk Stratgey" The [Manchester] Guardian (30 October
1995) 2-2.
27 See W. Lightfoot, "Labour Takes Gamble With Bankruptcy" The [Manchester] Guardian
(22 March 1999) 19.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1
INSOLVENCY IN ENGLAND AND WALES
1988-1997
Year Bankruptcy Deeds of Individual Total
Orders Arrangement Voluntary
Arrangements
1988 7,717 11 779 8,507
1989 8,138 3 1,224 9,365
1990 12,058 2 1,927 13,987
1991 22,632 6 3,002 25,640
1992 32,106 2 4,686 36,794
1993 31,016 8 5,679 36,703
1994 25,634 2 5,103 30,739
1995 21,933 2 4,384 26,319
1996 21,803 2 4,466 26,271
1997 19,892 4 4,545 24,441
Source: For data from 1988-1991, see Lord Chancellor's Department, Judicial Statistics: England
and Wales (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1988), and similarly titled reports for each
successive year. A compilation of the data from 1992-1997 is available through the Department of
Trade and Industry Statistical Directorate: see online: The Insolvency Service <www.dti.gov.uk/
insolv_s/insolvhm.htm> (date accessed: 22 June 1999).




Year* Sequestrations Registered Total
Protected Trust
Deeds
1988/89 1,612 10 1,622
1989/90 2,618 12 2,630
1990/91 5,451 3 5,454
1991/92 8,587 1 8,588
1992/93 11,970 2 11,972
1993/94 4,022 282 4,304
1994/95 2,340 424 2,764
1995/96 2,380 525 2,905
1996/97 2,534 532 3,066
1997/98 2,701 890 3,591
Source: Accountant in Bankruptcy, AnnualReportfor 1997198 (Edinburgh: Accountant in
Bankruptcy, 1998) at Tables (i), (iv).
* Year beginning 1 April and ending 31 March.
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Year* Initiated by Initiated by Initiated by Initiated by Total




1988/89 44 748 820 1,612
1989/90 41 1,800 777 2,618
1990/91 30 4,340 1,081 5,451
1991/92 3 7,471 1,113 8,587
1992/93 52 10,380 1,538 11,970
1993/94 80 630 2,555 757 4,022
1994/95 101 1,073 2 1,164 2,340
1995/96 85 1,163 2 1,130 2,380
1996/97 97 1,350 7 1,080 2,534
1997/98 85 1,532 12 1,072 2,701
Source: Accountant in Bankruptcy, Annual Report For 1997/98 (Edinburgh: Accountant in
Bankruptcy, 1998) at Table (iv).
* Year beginning 1 April and ending 31 March.

